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Abstract 
Many economic studies suggest that China would reap significant benefits from 
participating in a global cap-and-trade regime. The question then is that even if such a 
regime is so beneficial to China, why China has consistently refused in international 
negotiations even to discuss its participation in it. In this paper, we look at this issue from 
the following perspectives: a) from the point of view of fairness, how do developing 
countries including China and India perceive emissions caps in the first place?; b) why 
have China and India been sceptical to international emissions trading?; c) how is an 
inflow of CDM investment in China perceived politically in comparison with the exports of 
emissions permits to the U.S.?; d) what are the implications of “lock  in” to emissions cap, 
in particular no rules and principles for setting emissions targets for the commitment 
periods subsequent to Kyoto?; e) how to address the complex undertaking of setting 
emissions caps for developing countries, which must be linked to future, unobserved 
levels in comparison with the historically observed levels for industrialized countries?. 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyse why China has not embraced an 
international greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme, thus pointing out 
efforts/directions towards getting the country into such a scheme. Thus, the paper is of 
significant policy relevance. 
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Being the world’s most populous country, China is a large greenhouse gas emissions 
source that grows rapidly in line with its industrialisation and urbanization, and has a 
great deal of low-cost greenhouse gas abatement options. That explains why many 
economic studies by Zhang (2000 and 2004) and those examined by Stanford 
University’s Energy Modeling Forum (Weyant, 1999) show that China would reap 
significant benefits from participating in a global cap-and-trade regime. Even if such a 
regime is so beneficial to China, why has China consistently refused in international 
negotiations even to discuss its participation in it? I gauge at least five reasons for 
China’s stance. 
 
First and most importantly, participating emissions trading requires countries to take on 
emissions caps. However, developing countries including China and India consider it 
unfair to impose on emissions caps on developing countries in the first place until Annex 
1 countries give clear signs that they have taken the lead required in cutting their own 
greenhouse gas emissions. Developing countries regard their emissions as survival 
emissions and those from Annex 1 countries as luxury emissions. Many economic studies 
(Weyant, 1999; Zhang, 2000 and 2004) premise that China would take on emissions caps 
and then calculate what outcomes would be for China. This is a classical way to address 
an issue of “what is” in positive economics. But China may not consider it as an issue of 
“what is”. Instead, China may consider it as an issue of “what ought to be” in normative 
economics. Moreover, more than half the Group of 77 (G77) are even more vulnerable to 
climate change than other peers in this Group and thus demand deeper cuts in emissions 
to prevent dangerous climate change. Given China’s desire for the unity of the G77, 
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maintaining a united G77 front would necessitate taking their interests into account. 
Pushing for stringent commitments by Annex 1 countries is just to that end and appears a 
better negotiating tactic to pursue than demanding more generous targets for developing 
countries themselves, in particular given that the current emissions commitments by 
Annex 1 countries are far short of what developing countries called for at Kyoto and had 
been relaxed substantially by allowing significant sinks credits in Marrakech Accords.1  
 
Table 1  Quantitative Implications of the Marrakech Accords 
Regiona Baseline 
emissions 
(MtC) 
Nominal 
reduction 
(% wrt 1990) 
Effective 
reduction 
(% wrt 2010) 
Absolute 
cutback 
(MtC wrt 2010) 
 1990 2010 w/o sinks w/t sinks w/o sinks w/t sinks w/o sinks w/t sinks
AUN 88 130 – 6.8 – 9.4 27.6 25.9 36 34 
CAN 126 165 6.0 – 5.2 28.2 19.7 47 32 
EUR 930 1040 7.8 6.2 17.5 16.1 182 168 
JPN 269 330 6.0 1.1 23.4 19.4 77 64 
EEC 279 209 7.1 4.9 – 24.0 – 26.9 -50 – 56 
FSU 853 593 0 – 4.2 – 43.8 – 49.8 –260 – 296 
Total w/o USb 2545 2467 4.3 0.9 1.3 – 2.2 32 – 54 
USA 1345 1809 7.0 3.7 30.9 28.4 558 514 
Total w/t USc 3890 4276 5.2 1.9 13.8 10.8 590 460 
 
a AUN – Australia and New Zealand; CAN – Canada; EUR - OECD Europe; JPN – 
Japan; EEC - Central and Eastern European countries; FSU - Former Soviet Union. 
b Annex B total without the U.S. ratification. 
c Annex B total with the U.S. ratification. 
Source: Löschel and Zhang (2002). 
                                                 
1 Significant sinks credits allowed in the Marrakech Accords relax the emissions targets 
substantially. Table 1 contains the nominal percentage reductions with respect to (wrt) 
1990 emissions levels and the effective percentage reductions with respect to baseline 
emissions in 2010 for both the original Kyoto emissions targets and the revised targets 
under the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakech Accords. As a result of allowing countries 
to count the amount of sinks credits, the average reduction target for the Annex B 
countries as a whole is reduced to 1.9 percent, in comparison with the original reduction 
target of 5.2 percent (Löschel and Zhang, 2002). 
 4
Second, China and India have been sceptical to international emissions trading.2 First, 
they are not convinced that international emissions trading would lead to actual 
reductions in emissions; instead, it would merely shift reductions overseas and is seen as 
a way for industrialized countries to avoid undertaking costly abatement actions at 
home.3 Clearly, this issue is related to target setting, not to emissions trading per se 
(Zhang, 1998). However, international emissions trading makes the issue explicit, thus 
raising these countries’ suspicion against emissions trading. Second, China and India 
regard the present rather arbitrary allocation of assigned amounts to industrialised 
countries based on historical emission levels under the Kyoto Protocol as attempts to 
create new property rights for the atmosphere. At the international climate negotiations, 
they made it clear that any trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol does not 
bestow rights or entitlements to Annex B countries (UNFCCC, 1999). China and India 
insist that before emissions trading commences, the entitlements of both developed and 
developing countries have to be defined (Sharma, 1998). Third, China may consider that 
benefits of clean development mechanism (CDM) projects are real and at the same time, 
may perceive the positive outcomes that have been demonstrated in domestic emissions 
trading elusive. In principle, greenhouse gases offer an even more attractive case for 
application of emissions trading than many local pollutants already well handled with 
emissions trading. However, at the international level, emissions trading is being tested. 
                                                 
2 The operation of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme may help China 
and India to change their views on international emissions trading. 
3 In his statement to the COP3, Chen Yaobang, head of the Chinese delegation, rejected 
emissions trading and joint implementation schemes, insisting that these schemes were 
unacceptable because they would allow industrialised countries to shirk their 
responsibilities of cutting emissions at home while disregarding the living’s environment 
of people in other countries (People’s Daily, 1997).  
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The successful U.S. SO2 Allowance Trading Program cannot just be transplanted into the 
international terrain where legal and institutional ingredients differ substantially from those 
in the U.S., not to mention no institutional and infrastructure supports for operating 
emissions trading in place in the majority of developing countries.4 This leaves it doubtful 
that China would perceive that emissions trading would work in practice to its advantage. 
 
Third, China may perceive an inflow of CDM investment in China to be much less 
politically sensitive than the exports of emissions permits to the U.S.. In practice, CDM 
investment is most likely to be a climate component added to existing and future FDI 
(foreign direct investment) projects. Even in the optimistic case where the U.S. was 
engaged in the Kyoto Protocol, the total inflow of CDM investment in China in 2010 
would be estimated to be a value of US$ 1.7 billion even in the optimistic case of full 
global emissions trading (Zhang, 2000). This is only few percentage of the current total 
FDI in China, which is now about US$ 60 billion. FDI has been serving as a powerful 
engine driving China’s economic growth, and is perceived positively both inside and 
outside China. Binding with FDI would make an inflow of CDM investment in China 
                                                 
4 Even for the U.S. SO2 Allowance Trading Program, the entire process from the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency beginning to compile the data for its allocation 
database in 1989 to publishing its final allowance allocations in March 2003 took almost 
four years (Harvey et al., 2003). For the first phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 
the entire process took almost two years from the EU publishing the Directive 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading on July 23, 2003 to 
its approving the last national allocation plan for Greece on June 20, 2005 (Zhang, 2006). 
For a country like China with very weak environmental institutions and that does not 
have dependable data on emissions, fuel uses and outputs for installations, this allocation 
process is expected to take much longer than what experienced in the U.S. and the EU. 
This factor alone may lead China to give a second thought on the establishing of 
greenhouse gas emissions trading.  
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become less explicit from those who regard CDM as “foreign aid”.5 By contrast, the U.S. 
has already had huge trade deficit with China, and exporting a large volume of surplus 
permits from China to the U.S. would further deteriorate the U.S. trade balance sheet with 
China.6 Such trade impacts are not expected to be big, but may well be taken out of the 
context and be used to tackle China for other real matters.7 Thus, China needs to treat, 
with caution, any issue that may potentially worsen the trade deficit that it has with the 
U.S..  
 
Fourth, China is concerned about the implications of “lock in” to an emissions cap, in 
particular no rules and principles for setting emissions targets for the commitment periods 
subsequent to Kyoto. With the EU bubble treating its poorer member countries more 
leniently8 and the Russia Federation widely perceived to have been granted generous 
                                                 
5  Rep. Bill Archer (R-Texas), Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, for 
example, said that “It is another form of foreign aid” (Congressional Quarterly, 29 
November 1997). 
6 McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) suggest that massive exports of permits would lead to 
appreciation of the exporting country’s exchange rate and a decline in its exports other 
than permits. If China’s exports of permits to the U.S. would counteract a decline in 
China’s exports of goods and services to the U.S., then the U.S. trade balance sheet with 
China would not be deteriorated.  
7 When an issue in question has heavy dose of politics, no matter how small the impact 
the issue itself has, it can be amplified and taken out of the context making its potential 
implications non-trivial. Look at current Chinese food safety issue in the U.S.. No one 
would deny that China needs to take food safety concern seriously for the sake of both its 
own citizens and consumers elsewhere. However, the issue has been taken well beyond 
that context by the politicians and the media in the current situation of trade imbalance 
between the two countries. 
8 The 15 member countries of the EU are each listed with an 8% reduction from 1990 
levels in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol. In June 1998, the EU Council reached an 
agreement under which the commitments are redistributed among its member countries 
under the bubble provision as specified in Article 4 of the Protocol. This will now serve 
as the basis of EU ratification and the redefined targets will become the “quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments” for each EU member country under the 
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targets at Kyoto, it is conceivable that industrialized countries will use the same tactics to 
bribe developing countries, giving them more generous emissions targets to enlist them to 
assume emissions commitments. No doubt, granting generous targets would be much less 
unattractive to developing countries than asking more stringent targets. Developing 
countries can even gain in the short term, provided that their targets are set even above 
their business-as-usual levels. But once developing countries assume emissions 
commitments, they are expected to take even more stringent targets over time, which are 
generally reviewed by developing countries themselves as impeding their economic 
development prospects. What matters is the balance between this short-term benefits and 
the perceived long-term costs to developing countries in terms of restrictions to future 
economic growth. In this regard, rules and principles for setting emissions targets for the 
commitment periods subsequent to Kyoto would help developing countries to make 
informed decision on whether to take on commitments. Such principles measure wide 
differences in national circumstances and at the same time, allow the necessary flexibility 
to accommodate great uncertainty throughout the policy-economics-biophysical system. 
These principles need to be agreed on via international negotiations. Such principles do 
not necessarily ensure that developing countries would take on commitments. However, if no 
such principles are made clear at the outset, the likelihood would be even less for developing 
                                                                                                                                                 
Protocol. Comparing the differentiated targets with the EU common 8% reduction 
commitments, we can see that the redistribution of the commitments has allocated more 
assigned amounts to the poor countries, whose emissions are expected to rise fast, than 
their allowed levels under the Protocol. By permitting a 25-27% increase in emissions to 
Greece and Portugal, the EU internal burden sharing of its Kyoto commitments among 
the member countries clearly indicates that poorer countries should be treated more 
leniently. If Greece and Portugal can have this sort of rise, it would be very difficult for 
the EU to reject the demand from the really poor, that is, developing countries, for a not 
unreasonable leeway in emissions. 
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countries to assume commitments in the first place, even if such commitments are hardly 
challenging to them.  
 
Fifth, although many economic studies show that China would reap significant benefits 
from participating a global cap-and-trade regime, they don’t really address the complex 
undertaking of setting emissions caps for developing countries.9 Emissions targets of 
Annex B countries are set against their historically observed levels. But for developing 
countries, their living standards are still very low in comparison with their industrialized 
counterparts, and they have legitimate demand for further development and economic 
growth. Thus, unlike Annex B countries, their targets, if any, must be linked to future, 
unobserved levels. Moreover, developing country economies tend to fluctuate more than 
those of industrialized countries. This will lead to considerable uncertainties over their 
economic growth rates and thus emissions projections. No doubt, the uncertainties would 
encourage developing countries to assume very pessimistic emissions targets when they 
are asked to take on commitments, thus raising great concern about the danger of 
generating “tropical hot air”. This clearly suggests that it is not an easy matter to set 
emissions caps for developing countries to the satisfaction to themselves as well as to 
industrialized countries.10 
                                                 
9 This point is somewhat related to the first point in the paper, but they discuss different 
issues. The first point focuses on why China should take on greenhouse gas emissions 
caps – prerequisite for international emissions trading, whereas the point touches on 
technical difficulty in setting emissions caps for countries like China. Because the first 
issue is more fundamental and this one is of technical nature, so the paper lists the first 
issue as the first reason and thus first discusses it. We could put them together, but I view 
points 2-4 in the paper are more important than this point. That is the reason why I 
discuss it as the last, fifth point. 
10 In the recent debate on “China about to become top carbon emitter” (Financial Times, 
2007a) and “China rebuts carbon emission forecast” (Financial Times, 2007b), divergent 
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